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Multi-national Industry Capacity
in the North Sea Flatfish Fishery
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Food and Resource Economics Institute
Abstract   Fisheries managers often see the management of regional fisheries
as a more pertinent approach than managing separate national fleet units that
exploit numerous fish stocks. This article considers an industry approach, using
data envelopment analysis (DEA), to shed light on the exploitation of the North
Sea flatfish fishery by a multi-national fleet, identifying overcapacity and pos-
sible reductions of the current fleet. The analysis estimates that the same catch
could be taken with a fleet at 77% of its current size, and suggests an optimal
reallocation of fixed inputs of each national fleet. Further insight is also given
to surplus and optimal vessels in terms of catches and vessel characteristics.
Simulations of the impact of possible quota reductions and restrictions of equal
capacity reduction across nations are also considered.
Key words   Data Envelopment Analysis, capacity output, industry allocation,
multi-national fleet.
JEL Classification Codes   C14, D24, Q22.
Introduction
Fishing capacity has become a management topic of great significance in recent
years. Problems stemming from ill-defined property rights and race to fish
behaviour include overcapitalisation of the fishing industry and consistent
overexploitation of the resource base. Under the initiative of the Food and Agricul-
ture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Plan of Action
for the Management of Fishing Capacity, the use of Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) has been proposed as the preferred tool to enable the measurement of fishing
capacity worldwide (FAO 2001). Such analysis gives fishery managers valuable in-
formation on the commensurate level of fleet capacity, given the availability of
resources and the economic status of the fishing industry. Most capacity analyses
have, however, concentrated on single fleets defined by nationality or gear type,
whereas a multi-national fleet approach may be more desirable.1
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What has become increasingly clear is the general wish of fisheries managers to
know the level of capacity on a fishery, national or regional level, and not purely the
capacity of a small number of independent operating units. This is none more evi-
dent than in the European Union (EU), where recently adopted reforms of the
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aim to deal with multi-national regulation on a
stock-by-stock basis. In such cases, an industry allocation model can be applied to
address the status of capacity on a fishery level (e.g., for particular fish stocks), and
so include multi-national fleets that operate in the same fishery. Further, reallocation
of capital, labour, and other productive resources in relation to capacity adjustment
initiatives can similarly be estimated on a multi-national level.
The EU capacity problem has received specific attention during the last two de-
cades through the implementation of capacity adjustment programmes. Under the
Multiannual Guidance Programme (MAGP), an overall EU fleet reduction of 20% in
terms of vessel tonnage and engine power has resulted over the last two decades, al-
though to highly variable extents across fleet segments and member states.
Following the reform of the CFP, capacity reduction will now be targeted in re-
sponse to required cuts in fishing mortality of overexploited stocks. It can thus be
anticipated, for example, that any desired reductions in flatfish mortality rates will
require a reduction in capacity, equally applied to those nations that exploit the flat-
fish fishery in the North Sea due to the concept of relative stability.
The aim of this article is to apply DEA to analyse the multi-national capacity
dimension of the North Sea flatfish fishery, based on aggregated input/output data
for 1998. The multi-national aspect of this article is important, since no other analy-
ses of this nature have been carried out for European fisheries. The article applies a
methodology developed by Dervaux, Kerstens, and Leleu (2000), based on the Johansen
(1972) short-run sector model, and combines capacity at the individual firm level and at
the industry level. This helps to evaluate overall capacity reductions through reallocation
of inputs at the industry level. Other papers that have analysed industry reallocation in-
clude Färe et al. (2000) and Kerstens, Vestergaard, and Squires (2004).
This article firstly introduces the North Sea fisheries, where fish stocks, fleet
components, and management regulations are discussed. The DEA capacity analysis
approach is reviewed and the two-phase analysis is outlined: the firm model phase
and industry allocation phase. Model specifications and data are described, and re-
sults of the allocation analysis are presented and discussed. An impact analysis for
various quota reduction scenarios is also undertaken, directly linked to current EU man-
agement policies, as well as imposing equal capacity reduction across all nations.2
Concluding remarks are finally drawn.
North Sea Fisheries
The North Sea (ICES Division IV) is a multi-species, multi-gear fishery of great
commercial importance in many European countries (figure 1). Historically, more
than half of all total allowable catches (TACs) of commercially targeted species in
EU waters is from the North Sea, with most of the commercial activity undertaken
by fishermen from the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Ger-
many, Belgium, and Norway. Fish landed for human consumption include pelagic
species such as herring, mackerel, and horse mackerel. Demersal species include
cod, haddock, whiting and saithe, and benthic flatfish species such as sole and pla-
ice. There are also several commercially important molluscs and crustaceans.
2 In line with the ‘relative stability’ principle of the EU that requires the current balance between mem-
ber states be maintained, based on historical landings of member states.Industry Capacity in the NS Flatfish Fishery 387
Landings from the industrial fishery mainly consist of sandeel, Norway pout, and
sprat.
North Sea TACs for all species are assigned on the basis of recent historic catch
data, and the fishery is managed according to the guidelines of the CFP, through in-
ter alia vessel and gear restrictions, effort controls, area closures, and minimum
landing sizes. The national management measures with regard to the implementation
of the quota differ both between species and countries, however. The fleets exploit-
ing the North Sea fishery have also been impacted by capacity and effort restrictions
under the MAGP of the EU. Norway has, in this regard, cooperated with the EU by
defining suitable management measures for their industry.
Flatfish Fishery
The flatfish fishery of the North Sea is of significant commercial importance. Sole
and plaice dominate the fishery, and are usually targeted with a bycatch of demersal
species. Other flatfish species targeted or landed as bycatch in the fishery include
brill, dab, flounder, lemon sole, megrim, and turbot. The flatfish stocks have dete-
riorated over the last 10 years; the major reasons being continuously high
exploitation, fluctuating recruitment, and extensive discarding (ICES 2002).
Sole (Solea solea) is mainly taken by beam trawlers in a mixed fishery with pla-
ice using 80 mm mesh in the southern part of the North Sea. There is also a directed
gill net sole fishery around the Danish coast, predominantly in the second quarter of
the year (CEFAS 2002). According to the International Council for the Exploration
of the Sea (ICES), the stock is currently being harvested outside safe biological lim-
its. The spawning stock biomass reached a historic low in 19983 at 25,000 tonnes,
Figure 1.  North Sea Fishing Areas, ICES Divisions IVabc
Source: Adapted from CEFAS (2002).
3 1998 is also the year chosen for this analysis, given the availability of data. It is thus conceivable that
the poor catches in 1998 may adversely impact the capacity utilisation scores of fleets.Lindebo 388
but was followed by a slight recovery as the result of a strong year class in 1996.
Fishing mortality has risen gradually since 1960, mainly due to the development of
the beam trawl fishery. The reported nominal catches and estimated landings of
North Sea sole during 1994–2001 can be viewed in table 1, below.
Plaice (Pleuronectus platessa) in the North Sea is mainly taken by beam trawls
in a mixed fishery with sole using 80 mm mesh or as a directed fishery using nets
above 100 mm. The remainder is taken in a directed fishery with seines and gill nets
and a mixed otter trawl fishery. A protected nursery area in the coastal waters of the
eastern North Sea, the Plaice Box, was established in 1989 in order to reduce the
amount of discarding of undersized fish. Since 1995 the area has been closed for
beam trawlers >300 HP. In 1999, the EU and Norway agreed to implement a long-
term management plan for plaice (CEFAS 2002).
The stock is also considered by ICES to be outside safe biological limits. The
spawning stock biomass declined from 1989 to 1997, when it reached its historical
minimum of 180,000 tonnes, and similar to sole, was followed by a recovery as a result
of a strong year class in 1996. Fishing mortality increased from the 1960s to the 1990s,
again mainly through the expansion of the beam trawl fleets. The reported nominal
landings of North Sea plaice during 1994–2001 can be viewed in table 2, below.
The TACs for sole and plaice in 2003 were 15,850 tonnes and 73,250 tonnes,
respectively (DG Fisheries 2003). The flatfish quota allocations for 2003 in the
North Sea are shown in figure 2, below.
Table 1
Reported Nominal Catches and Estimated Landings of North Sea Sole (tonnes)
Country 1994 1996 1998 2001
Denmark 1,804 1,018 520 773
Netherlands 22,874 15,344 15,198 11,547
United Kingdom 1,137 848 549 596
Other1 5.476 3,989 3,472 3,512
Unallocated landings2 1,711 1,532 1,129 3,421
Total landings estimate 33,002 22,651 20,868 19,849
TAC 32,000 23,000 19,100 19,000
Source: ICES (2002).
1 Includes Belgium, Germany, France, and other countries.
2 Landings cannot be specified for a specific country.
Table 2
Reported Nominal Landings of North Sea Plaice (tonnes) to ICES
Country 1994 1996 1998 2001
Denmark 17,056 11,776 10,087 13,797
Netherlands 50,289 35,419 30,541 33,290
United Kingdom 27,749 20,992 19,915 19,111
Other1 14,585 11,846 9,861 13,466
Unallocated landings2 713 1,640 1,130 2,183
Total landings estimate 110,392 81,673 71,534 81,847
TAC 165,000 81,000 87,000 78,000
Source: ICES (2002).
1 Includes Belgium, Germany, France, Norway, and Sweden.
2 Landings cannot be specified for a specific country.Industry Capacity in the NS Flatfish Fishery 389
Flatfish Fleet
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are among the countries that
dominate the North Sea flatfish fishery. These national fleets serve as the basis for
the analysis presented in this article. Fleet components from Belgium, Germany, and
Norway are also present and play an important role in the fishery, but are not in-
cluded in the analysis due to the lack of available vessel-level data.
The major components of the Danish fleet are trawlers, gill netters, and Danish
seiners. Gill netters and Danish seiners primarily target sole, plaice, other flatfish,
and cod. Trawlers have a varied product mix that includes flatfish, codfish, herring,
mackerel, crustaceans, and industrial species, with the species targeted largely being
determined by vessel size and access to coastal and international fishing areas. The
Danish fleet represented about 15% of total plaice landings in the North Sea in 1998
(table 2), the year chosen for the capacity analysis outlined in this article.
The cutter fleet of the Netherlands mainly targets flatfish, shrimp, cod, and
whiting in the North Sea and coastal waters. The fleet is the biggest producer of flat-
fish in Europe, predominantly caught by beam trawlers, which cover nearly 90% of
all kW-days spent in the fishery and account for more than 80% of revenues in the
fishery (FOI 2001; Vestergaard et al. 2002). In addition to EU regulation, the Dutch
beam trawl fishery is managed by Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), with ves-
sels pooling their ITQs within producer organisation management groups. Beam
trawlers also have small bycatch quotas for cod and whiting. The Dutch fleet was
responsible for almost three-quarters of total North Sea sole landings in 1998, and
over 40% of total plaice landings (tables 1 and 2). Participating United Kingdom
vessels are mainly demersal beam trawlers, with the fleet being responsible for al-
most 30% of total North Sea plaice landings in 1998.
Figure 2.  Allocation of North Sea Flatfish TACs in 2003
Source: DG Fisheries (2003).Lindebo 390
DEA Capacity Analysis
Based on the traditional Farrell (1957) approach to technical efficiency (TE) analy-
sis, Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984)
were the first to apply DEA to multiple input, multiple output processes. Since then,
DEA has been used to assess efficiency in many different areas, ranging from the
fishing industry to the public sector. The DEA technique allows the assessment of
efficiency of an existing technology relative to a ‘best practice’ frontier technology,
formed as a non-parametric, piece-wise linear combination of observed ‘best prac-
tice’  activities  (Coelli,  Rao,  and  Battese  1999). The  frontier  envelops  the
observations that are not ‘best practice’; i.e., not operating at full technical effi-
ciency, and allows for the calculation of technical efficiency scores for each
observation based on their radial distance from the frontier. In the output-oriented
approach, these scores indicate how close the actual output is to the maximal output
that could be produced given the observed input levels (fixed as well as variable).
The TE approach can be extended to the analysis of fishing capacity utilisation.
Fishing capacity is here defined as a short-run concept in line with Johansen (1968),
where capacity is “the level of output of fish over a period of time that a given fish-
ing fleet could expect to catch if variable inputs are utilised under normal operating
conditions, for a given resource condition, state of technology and other constraints”
(Walden, Kirkley, and Kitts 2003). Färe, Grosskopf, and Valdmanis (1989) show
how DEA can be applied to estimate the Johansen concept of full capacity. The ap-
proach is, in essence, the same as the Farrell TE approach, but where variable inputs
are allowed to vary freely.
The Johansen (1972) short-run sector model allows for the analysis of the indus-
try structure, following from the Johansen (1968) capacity measure at the firm level.
This helps to determine the optimal level of firm capacities and minimises the levels
of fixed inputs whilst maintaining the current output. Dervaux, Kerstens, and Leleu
(2000) later refined this approach by accommodating multiple outputs and adopting
the DEA frontier-based method.
This article adopts a physical nonparametric approach to estimating capacity, as
discussed above. It is nevertheless noted that economic approaches also exist, the
dual approaches. In this regard, there are three basic ways of defining a cost-based
notion of capacity; namely, (i) the minimum of the short-run variable cost function
(Morrison 1985; Nelson 1989), (ii) the minimum of the long-run total cost function
(Cassels 1937; Klein 1960), and (iii) a tangency definition based on the intersection
point of short- and long-run expansion paths (Segerson and Squires 1990, among
others). Capacity notions have also been defined based on the revenue function
(Segerson and Squires 1995) and on the profit function (Squires 1987). Furthermore,
Prior (2003) applies a cost-minimisation approach to DEA, where capacity
utilisation is defined in terms of a ratio of minimum long-run total costs to minimum
short-run total costs (i.e., minimum variable costs plus fixed costs). The DEA used
here is nonparametric in contrast to the parametric approach that requires estimation
of cost functions by means of econometrics.
Although a dual economic approach to estimating capacity is intuitively appeal-
ing, it requires detailed vessel-level cost data for the vector inputs. Given the scope
of this article, in which I attempt to contrast multi-national fleet technologies, such
data are not available for all the national fleets concerned. Hence, this article opts
for the physical approach of estimating capacity.Industry Capacity in the NS Flatfish Fishery 391
Firm Model
The estimation of capacity output at the firm level can be obtained by solving a linear
programming model (Vestergaard et al. 2002; Vestergaard, Squires, and Kirkley 2003).4
The model designates the vector of outputs by y and the vector of inputs by x,
with M outputs, F fixed inputs, V variable inputs, and J firms. Capacity output and
the optimum input utilisation values require the solution of the following problem
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where q1
k is the capacity score greater than or equal to 1; i.e., the amount by which
the output must be increased to reach full capacity utilisation; ykm is the amount of
output, m, produced by firm k; xkf is the quantity of fixed input used by firm k; xkv is
the quantity of variable input used by firm k; zj is the activity vector for firm j; and
lkv is the variable input utilisation rate. The variable input utilisation rate is the ratio
of optimal use of the v’th variable input to observed use, ensuring full capacity for
firm k. Equation (2) represents one constraint for each output, while equation (3)
constrains the set of fixed inputs. Equation (4) allows the variable inputs to reach
their optimal levels, and equation (5) imposes variable returns to scale. An exclusion
of equation (5) would impose constant returns to scale. Equation (6) is the non-
negativity condition on the z and l variables.
The model is run once for each dataset, producing a capacity measure (q1
k) for
each vessel, k, in the dataset. This measure indicates the possible radial expansion of
outputs given the inputs of each vessel. For example, a score of 1.20 indicates that a
4 The DEA models are written and executed using the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS)
software (Brooke et al. 1998).Lindebo 392
vessel should be able to increase each of its outputs by 20%. Capacity output for
each firm k can then be determined by multiplying the capacity measure (q1
k) by ob-
served output vector (ykm). It should be noted that the capacity output calculated here
includes potential technical inefficiencies.5
The reason for running separate firm models for each country, rather than incor-
porating all the dataset observations in one model, is important. We acknowledge
that although all the firms are fishing the same stocks and face similar resource con-
ditions, the different countries face different technologies (e.g., gear technologies)
and regulation measures, and hence warrant separate analysis.
Industry Allocation Model
From the firm model described above, we can construct the individual frontiers of
the fleets participating in a fishery. These individual frontiers (e.g., frontier tech-
nologies 1, 2, and 3) can then be compared to each other in aggregate (figure 3) and
used to assess the overcapacity of each fleet, and thus the corresponding fleet reduc-
tions. This is especially helpful if, as in the North Sea flatfish fishery, we have
different country fleets that will have very different technologies in a standard firm
model analysis.
5 Färe et al. (1994) offer an ‘unbiased’ measure of capacity output by assuming that the currently ob-
served output is produced in a technically efficient manner, helping to remove the technical inefficiency
increment from the capacity output scores.
Figure 3.  Stylised Representation of the Industry ApproachIndustry Capacity in the NS Flatfish Fishery 393
In order to test their technologies against each other, we first run the individual
firm models described above for each fleet. From these models the optimal activity
vector, z*k, is provided for each firm k. This allows the computation of output at full


















The outputs are increased, the fixed inputs decreased if they have excess slacks (but
not by much according to the firm model), and the variable inputs either increase or
decrease depending on which operation makes the vessel operate at full capacity,
thus projecting each non-efficient vessel on the frontier as a linear combination of
one or more of the originally efficient vessels. These optimal frontier figures are
then used as parameters in a short-run industry model (Dervaux, Kerstens, and Leleu
2000; Vestergaard et al. 2002). Based on the methodology developed by Dervaux,
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where Ym is the m’th industry output level, Xv is the industry’s use of variable inputs,
Xf is the aggregate fixed inputs available to the industry, and P is the total number of
observations in all countries. The activity vector, zj, is constrained so current capaci-
ties of each vessel cannot be exceeded, equation (13).7
It is noted that the constraint imposed in equation (12) relating to the input use
is trivial (since the final input use cannot exceed current input use given that zj is
6 Other approaches to industry capacity include Färe et al. (1992) and Färe et al. (2000).
7 In contrast to the firm model where zj represents the activity vector of each firm.Lindebo 394
less than or equal to 1), but is maintained for completeness. The solution gives the
combination of firms that can produce the same or more total outputs with less or
the same amount of fixed inputs in aggregate, and allows for the identification of
surplus vessels in an optimal fleet structure.
Traditionally the TAC of the species fished should serve as a reference level, Y,
to possible production in the North Sea flatfish fishery (equation 10). However,
since not all vessels in the fishery are included in the analysis, the reference level
applied here is the total observed catches of the vessels in the dataset.
The model is highly flexible and can incorporate restrictions on equal input re-
ductions across fleets and nations, in line with current capacity policies in EU
fisheries. Similarly, declines in stock biomass and quotas can be easily simulated by
the model. Such impacts in industry reallocation are analysed in this article.
Data
Given the structure of the flatfish fishery in the North Sea and data availability, the
fleet data applied to the analysis are comprised of annual 1998 catch data from
North Sea vessels of Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.8
Vessels are only included in the dataset if (i) at least 30% of their total catch is
composed of flatfish and (ii) they spent at least 50 days in the North Sea in 1998.
The fixed inputs registered for each vessel are gross tonnage (GT) and engine power
(kW), and variable inputs are days at sea (DAS). The outputs are registered in terms
of aggregated catches of each vessel in the North Sea in 1998, classified as sole, pla-
ice, other flatfish, and other fish, measured in unweighted kilograms.9
The vessel and catch characteristics of the fleets are depicted in tables 3 and 4,
below.
As viewed in table 4, a fair coverage of the North Sea fishery is observed, with
the model coverage ranging from 31% to 66% of total national catches in the sole
and plaice fisheries. Average vessel characteristics and associated catches of the
analysed fleets are portrayed in tables 5 and 6, below. It is clearly shown that Dutch
vessels are generally bigger than their counterparts. Danish vessels, on the other
hand, are markedly smaller and spend fewer fishing days in the North Sea. Catches
of sole and other flatfish are dominated by the Netherlands, whereas the United
Kingdom vessels catch mostly plaice.
Table 3
Fleet Characteristics, 1998
Country Vessels Total GT Total kW Total DAS Gear Types
Denmark 110 6,313 18,263 13,632 28 TR, 45 DS, 37 GN*
Netherlands 62 18,661 88,358 11,981  Beam Trawl
United Kingdom 36 9,053 33,983 7,183 Beam Trawl
Note: *Trawl (TR), Danish Seine (DS), Gill Net (GN).
8 Available vessel-level data is for 1998 only.
9 In contrast to revenue-weighted catches that are sometimes used to distinguish the relative importance
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Results
Capacity of National Fleets—Firm Level
The first stage of the analysis looks at the capacity output scores of the national
fleets in isolation. The capacity output scores indicate the desired average expansion
of the output vectors of vessels in each fleet to reach full capacity (figure 4 and
table 7). For example, the average Dutch vessel should increase its output by 15% to
operate at full capacity. The average UK and Danish vessels should increase their
outputs by 68% and 72%, respectively.
Capacity of the North Sea Fleet—Industry Model
Following the projection of vessels [equations (7)-(8)] onto their respective national
capacity frontiers and the industry minimisation problem [equations (9)-(13)], the
resulting reduction q of the fixed inputs is 0.768 or 23%. That is, only 77% of cur-
Table 4
Catch (tonnes) per Fleet, 1998
% NS Sole % NS Plaice Other
Country Sole Landings* Plaice Landings* Flatfish Other Fish Total
Denmark 199 38% 6,648 66% 1,298 5,752 13,897
Netherlands 4,966 33% 9,601 31% 2,616 5,436 22,619
United Kingdom 251 46% 8,829 44% 553 2,243 11,876
Note: *Represents the % covered by the analysed vessels as a proportion of the observed national total
sole and plaice catches in the North Sea in 1998.
Table 5
Vessel Characteristics, 1998
Country Vessels Average GT Average kW Average DAS
Denmark 110 57 166 124
Netherlands 62 301 1,425 193
United Kingdom 36 251 944 200
Table 6
Average Catch (kg) per Vessel, 1998
Country Sole Plaice Other Flatfish Other Fish Total
Denmark 1,809 60,436 11,800 52,290 126,335
Netherlands 80,097 154,855 42,194 87,677 364,823
United Kingdom 6,972 245,250 15,361 62,306 329,889Lindebo 396
rent fixed inputs of the total North Sea fleet are required to produce the current level
of output. Table 8 and figure 5 help to illustrate the proportions by which fleet and
industry inputs should be specifically reduced, allowing a reallocation of produc-
tion. The results also help to identify the particular vessels that are deemed ‘surplus’
and should exit the fleet. Here, a surplus vessel is not necessarily an inefficient or
unprofitable vessel, but is deemed surplus by the model (being assigned an activity
vector zj equal to 0), as the particular vessel is unnecessary to produce the outputs
from the available mixes of industry inputs. The ‘optimal’ vessels are those that re-
main in the optimal full-capacity North Sea fleet following reallocation.
It is noted that the surplus vessels do not necessarily correspond to reductions in
kW and GT. This is an explicit component of the industry model. Some vessels that
remain may be assigned an activity contraction vector that is less than 1 but greater
than 0, as a result of the minimisation problem in equations (9)-(13). Results show,
however, that only four vessels remain in the fleet with activity contraction vectors,
and hence the impact on the overall fixed input reductions is minor.
The results indicate that the United Kingdom fleet should reduce its fixed inputs
by some 40%. The Danish fleet is less impacted, with a required reduction of 23%,
with surplus vessels clearly being larger than their optimal counterparts (i.e., the 8%
reduction in surplus vessels is responsible for 23% of fixed GT and kW inputs). Fur-
ther, an optimal (full capacity) North Sea fleet needs to see reductions of Dutch
inputs on the order of 15–18%.
As gathered from the firm model described above, Dutch vessels are, on aver-
Figure 4.  Average Vessel Capacity Output
Table 7
Average Vessel Capacity Output
Country Vessels Avg. Capacity Output St. Dev.
Denmark 110 1.72 1.35
Netherlands 62 1.15 0.21
United Kingdom 36 1.68 1.53Industry Capacity in the NS Flatfish Fishery 397Lindebo 398
age, closer to operating at full capacity (table 7 and figure 4). It is intuitively pleas-
ing to see that these vessels require smaller cutbacks in the industry model, although
it is noted that low capacity output scores at the firm stage do not automatically lead
to low fleet reductions at the industry level, since all vessels are projected onto their
respective capacity frontiers. One can nevertheless begin to consider plausible rea-
sons for the Dutch fleet results at the industry stage. It is conceivable that the ITQ
management system governing the Dutch beam trawlers has led to an improved,
more ‘flatfish-oriented’ frontier technology.
Surplus and Optimal Vessels
In addition to identifying the extent of input reductions and the nationality of ves-
sels most impacted, it is beneficial to examine the originally observed catch and
input characteristics of the surplus and remaining optimal vessels.10
It is interesting to examine the specific differences in sole and plaice catch com-
positions of surplus and optimal vessels, based on their originally observed catches
(figures 6 and 7). Results indicate that the optimal structure of the North Sea fleet
would favour the removal of Danish and Dutch vessels that have relatively low sole
catch rates. In the case of plaice, the surplus vessels of the United Kingdom, in par-
ticular, have much lower plaice catch rates than the optimal vessels.
In terms of average input and output characteristics, a further examination of
original, surplus, and optimal vessels can be considered for the North Sea fleet
(table 9 and figure 8).
Figure 5.  Reduction of Fixed Industry Inputs
10 The original input/output characteristics are those observed before vessels are projected onto their ca-
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Figure 6.  Average Sole Catches of National Vessels
Figure 7.  Average Plaice Catches of National Vessels
The benefits of industry reallocation are two-fold (figure 8). Firstly, the average
size of vessels in terms of GT and kW is reduced in the optimal setup, resulting in
increased catches per input usage. Secondly, following the removal of the surplus
vessels from the original fleet setup, a reallocation of catches among the remaining
optimal vessels will result.11 The total catch of each species is the same, so the new,
optimal fleet with a lower number of vessels will ultimately lead to higher catches
per vessel. It can be shown that the average catch per vessel of each species in-
creases by 19% as a result of catch reallocation among the vessels in the optimal
North Sea fleet, as portrayed in figure 8.
11 Through, for example, vessel decommissioning or transferral to activities other than fishing.Lindebo 400
Table 9
Average Vessel Indicators of Surplus Vessels
Country Vessels Catch (t) GT kW DAS
Denmark 9 132 113 282 128
Netherlands 8 304 263 1,318 182
United Kingdom 16 219 207 699 168
North Sea fleet 33 216 195 735 160
Figure 8.  Average Vessel Indicators of the North Sea Fleet
Impact of TAC Reductions
The impact of reductions in TACs on the reallocation of fixed inputs can be easily
incorporated into the industry model, helping to identify the vessels and nations
most affected by plausible changes in quota restrictions.12
Based on recorded sole and plaice TACs for 2003, the impact of TAC reductions
in the flatfish fishery can be examined. Here, TACs have decreased by 16% and
17%, for plaice and sole, respectively, since 1998. For illustrative purposes, reduc-
tions in other flatfish and other fish quotas can be similarly analysed (an arbitrary
reduction of 15% of these species groups has been applied in the model). Various
scenarios can be applied to the industry allocation model that restrict the total output
of the various species groups. For example, a TAC reduction in sole of 17% can be
simulated in the model by restricting overall catches of sole to 83% of the observed
1998 catches. Table 10, below, illustrates the impact on the North Sea fleet configu-
ration under six short-term scenarios.
12 An increase in quota can also be simulated, although it is not attempted in this article.Industry Capacity in the NS Flatfish Fishery 401
A constraint of this analysis is, however, that one can expect a drop in days at
sea in the short run following a reduction in quotas, which is not incorporated into
the model. This decline is not expected to be linear, given variable port proximity,
species behaviour, etc., and hence complicates the impact a quota reduction may
have. Despite this, for reasons of simplicity it is assumed that all vessels in the
North Sea will be equally impacted by quota reductions and will reduce their days at
sea in a similar linear fashion. In the long run, reductions in TACs will imply reduc-
tions in both variable and fixed inputs.
Table 10 depicts the reduction in vessel number under the various scenarios.13
When compared to the base case, it is fairly visible that the Dutch fleet is substan-
tially impacted by reductions in the sole TAC and total TAC. Danish vessels tend to
improve their status in the overall North Sea fleet following reductions in sole and
plaice TACs, whereas reductions in other flatfish TACs negatively impact the Dan-
ish fleet. The United Kingdom fleet sees further reductions in the fleet following a
cut in the plaice TAC as well as the total TAC.
Since these reductions in quota are not only plausible, but also very much a
management reality, it can be expected that this kind of impact analysis will provide
fisheries managers with important information on possible effects of TAC reductions
on different fleets. Conversely, and perhaps more relevant in the current manage-
ment setting, this type of analysis can supply managers with information on required
fleet reductions if stock conditions improve.14
It needs noting, however, that the undertaken analysis refers to a rather static,
short-term situation, where technologies cannot be altered, and may only provide a
‘worst-case’ snapshot scenario. It is likely that if quotas change considerably, then a
fleet will eventually react to the new status of stocks and economics and adapt their
technologies accordingly.
Table 10
Vessel Reductions (%) under TAC Scenarios
Reduction Denmark Netherlands United Kingdom
Base case None 8 13 44
Scenario 1 Sole: 17% 2 26 39
Scenario 2 Plaice: 16% 3 10 75
Scenario 3 Scenarios 1+2 2 16 67
Scenario 4 Other flatfish: 15% 16 13 42
Scenario 5 Other fish: 15% 8 13 44
Scenario 6 Total: 15% 10 24 58
13 As previously, the magnitude of GT and kW reductions will differ from those of vessel reductions.
Nevertheless, the table depicts the general change in input reductions of the various fleets under the
various scenarios.
14 Current EU fisheries policy initiatives are dominated by recovery plans of certain fish stocks (e.g.,
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Impact of Equal Fixed Input Reduction
In the industry problem given in equations (9)-(13), an overall reduction of the total
capacity of the North Sea fleet; i.e., of the capacity summed over all countries, is
evaluated. As shown previously, the individual capacity reductions of the three
country fleets will be different when using this method. The industry problem can,
however, be reformulated to claim equal capacity reductions for each country’s
fleet. Such a restriction may possibly result in lower overall reductions in fixed in-
puts and should be seen as a cost of implementing such restrictions, which is
intrinsically based on the relative stability (status quo) principle that underpins EU
fisheries policy and capacity management.15
Equal capacity reductions for each country’s fleet are imposed in the industry
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where C is the number of countries, and Jc is the number of firms in country c. This
problem results in an equal capacity reduction of q = 0.806 for each country, com-
pared to 0.768 for the total fleet in the base case (a difference of 3.8%). This entails
that an even reduction of fixed inputs of at least 19% is needed for each individual
fleet. It can thus be argued that on the basis of these analytical results, imposing
equal fixed input reduction does impact the overall reduction; i.e., the overall cost is
noticeable. The reallocation of fixed input reductions among nations, however, is
impacted, and the breakdown can be viewed in table 11 and figure 9.
As observed above, equal reductions of 19–20% in terms of GT and kW are now
required for all fleets. Compared to the base case, the Dutch fleet is required to
make more cutbacks than before. This allows many more United Kingdom vessels
(fixed inputs) to remain in the fishery.
Although EU policy supports relative stability of fishing nations, based on his-
torical landings of member states, capacity reduction programmes have not
attempted equal capacity reduction for all nations. Since the main objective of capacity
reduction has been to reduce fishing pressure on certain overexploited fish stocks, equal
overall reductions for all fleets have not been sought. The results show that imposing
equal fixed input reductions will lead to a smaller overall reduction of the North Sea
fleet and the overall composition of national fleets may be rather different.
15 A review of the EU fisheries policy and fleet capacity reduction programme can be found in Lindebo,
Frost, and Løkkegaard (2002).Industry Capacity in the NS Flatfish Fishery 403Lindebo 404
Concluding Remarks
The main motivation of this article was to analyse industrial capacity in a multi-na-
tional European fishery, which has not been attempted in fisheries economics
research to date. The analysis serves as a good example of how industry reallocation
theory can be directly incorporated into capacity analysis of a shared fishery. It is
shown how the results can be translated into useful fisheries management insight, in
terms of short-term industry capacity reduction for various scenarios. However, the
results stated herein should be considered with caution, given the aged, incomplete
data (i.e., not all vessels and national fleets are featured in the analysis), the dy-
namic changes in fish stocks, lack of economic considerations, and the inclusion of
technical inefficiencies. Furthermore, if this analysis is to provide authorities with a
complete planning model for the North Sea flatfish fishery, we also need to include
the other major players, such as Norway, Germany, and Belgium.
The article shows that the North Sea fleet, composed of Danish, Dutch, and
United Kingdom vessels, requires 23% reductions in fixed inputs to reach full ca-
pacity. The United Kingdom fleet requires the largest cutbacks of between 38–40%,
whereas the Danish and Dutch fleets need reductions of around 23% and 15–18%,
respectively. The analysis has further shed light on the catch and input characteris-
tics of surplus vessels following industry reallocation and shows variable outcomes
for the different fleets when catch rates of various species groups are examined. Fol-
lowing catch reallocation, after the removal of surplus vessels, overall catches per
remaining optimal vessels can expect to increase by 19%, on average. It would nev-
ertheless be interesting to apply economic capacity concepts to this analysis (i.e.,
incorporating costs and revenues), as this will likely capture different estimations of
fixed input reductions for the various national fleets and the overall North Sea fleet.
For further management insight, an impact analysis of quota (TAC) reductions
was undertaken. This can provide useful information for managers wishing to im-
prove stock conditions and help to identify the extent of fixed input reductions that
is required to obtain such improvements by means of quota reductions. Since future
quota reductions are highly plausible, this kind of impact analysis is of significant
importance. In line with the relative stability principle, a restriction on fixed input
reductions was simulated, resulting in 3.8% fewer fixed inputs being removed from
the fleet. A further impact is the reallocation of fixed input reductions among the
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three countries, as expected, leading to more Dutch vessels being affected than in
the base case. These results are further evidence of the strength and flexibility of the
industry model as an analytical tool for management initiatives. Policy decisions can
readily be incorporated as constraints on inputs and outputs and can be extended to
proposals for banning specific gear types in certain fisheries or decisions to enforce
stricter mesh size restrictions to lower fishing mortality rates of overexploited fish
stocks.
Of final note are the possible ramifications for fisheries management. Although
this article has helped to illustrate industry reallocation scenarios in the North Sea
flatfish fishery, what meaning will this have for future management initiatives? It
may be argued that even if all possible dynamic dimensions are accounted for in this
form of analysis, to allow for a more long-term approach, actually imposing the
favoured reallocation of industry inputs is still confronted with the limitations dic-
tated by relative stability. It is expected that any management advice based on
analytical results of this nature may face considerable difficulties of unilateral ac-
ceptance, regardless of what fisheries managers may decide is the most optimal and
efficient fleet configuration.
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